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This thesis examines U.S.-Canadian border threats and defenses and compares the U.S.-
Canadian situation with the European Schengen Convention (SC). The Department of 
Homeland Security coordinates U.S. security with representatives from law enforcement, 
military and civilian entities. Public Safety Canada coordinates defense in Canada. Prior 
to the 9/11 attack, the U.S.-Canadian relationship was similar to the SC, focusing on 
securing external borders while opening shared borders. Some experts, especially in the 
U.S., argue that border security needs to be tightened further while others contend 
increased U.S.-Canadian border security is unnecessary and harms commerce. 
In 2011, Denmark decided to increase internal border security, rejecting the SC 
tenets requiring common security of external border of the larger Schengen area and open 
internal zones. The increase represented a case study of unilateral border relations. 
Although never completed, the lessons of this brief experiment in increased border 
security are that homeland security decisions are based more on arguments of sovereignty 
and politics, rather than on objective determinations of threats and security. More 
broadly, this thesis argues that the U.S. and Canada can benefit from returning to an open 
border and push the threat as far away as possible. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The U.S.-Mexican border is half the size of the U.S.-Canadian border, but the 
resources committed to the south far exceed those dedicated to the north. Person and drug 
smuggling is the most significant reason for additional resources dedicated to the 
southern border. The southern border accounts for 70 percent to 90 percent of illegal 
substances entering the United States.1 In contrast, the northern border has never had the 
same number of border agents. The reasons for this disparity include a similar colonial 
origin and the strong and long-standing partnership between the United States and 
Canada as well as a significant link in military defense and economic interdependence.2  
Still, the U.S.-Canadian border is the subject of increasing debate and discussion. 
Mark Salter and Geneviève Piché describe how the view of the largely undefended 
northern border has changed in the last decade and is now treated as another security 
risk.3 Before 9/11, the border was seen as a trivial matter that did not require significant 
supervision. The view changed in response to terrorist attacks and increased media 
attention. Opposing the call for increased security is the belief that the border must also 
be open for commerce. The border is seen as a vital part of Canadian and U.S. economies 
that provides benefits to both states, and excessive controls present unnecessary obstacles 
to commerce between the U.S. and Canada.4 When examining maps of North America, 
like the one shown in Figure 1, it is easy to see how dominant the border is and how long 
the border weaves between the two states, straight in some sections and winding along 
rivers in others. 
                                                 
1 Imtiaz Hussain, Satya R. Pattnayak, and Anil Hira. North American Homeland Security: Back to 
Bilateralism? (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 185. 
2 Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era, 2
nd
 ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010), 86.  
3Mark B. Salter and Geneviève Piché, “The Securitization of the US-Canada Border in American 
Political Discourse,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (December 2011), 3.  
4 Sloan, Security, 86. 
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Figure 1.  North American Continent5  
This thesis examines two questions: 1) Are U.S.-Canadian border policies 
sufficient and effective in keeping the homeland secure? 2) Is there a different method to 
balance safety with commerce across the U.S.-Canadian border? The model to be 
examined is a fully open border, similar to the Schengen Convention (SC) in Europe that 
created an open area between the SC signatory nations. If applied to the U.S.-Canadian 
border, such an arrangement could permit the free flow of both goods and people.6  
This thesis will examine Denmark’s 2011 change of security requirements to 
comply with the SC that temporarily implemented additional border controls. The 
motivation for the change will be surveyed in order to understand how that nation can 
provide lessons for the U.S. This Danish effort provides a case study to examine the state 
of border security under two different conditions ranging from full compliance with a 
                                                 
5 “North America Maps,” last accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=5008750. 
6 Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 2. 
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multi-national security agreement (similar to the sort of U.S.-Canadian agreement that 
some experts recommend), to stricter border security implemented by a nation on its own 
(similar to tighter security measures supported by some, especially within the United 
States).  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The U.S.-Canadian border is the longest between any two countries in the world, 
with 5,525 miles across the continental states and Alaska combined.7 In addition, these 
countries share a unique and interdependent relationship based on historical ties and 
geographical proximity. The length of the border and varied topography complicate its 
defense from unauthorized or harmful entities. Based on the proximity of the two nations 
and their symbiotic relationship, damage to one may affect the other.  
Policy alternatives to border management consist of strengthening and solidifying 
the security of the United States from threats that may be presented by disreputable 
agents or forces that would illegally cross the border. The other option consists of 
opening the border fully to authorized members of both states thereby increasing 
cooperation and creating a larger safety zone consisting of working teams from both 
involved countries—a kind of North American Schengen Convention.  
Denmark aroused controversy across Europe when it decided to change how it 
interpreted the SC, increasing the size and strength of its border infrastructure rather than 
maintaining it open border across the participating nations. The change did not last very 
long. After four months, the Danish elected a new government, which canceled the 
previous government’s laws.  
The Denmark case is significant because it provides a natural experiment of a 
country that decides unilaterally to strengthen its border controls within a previously 
established international agreement across much of the European Union (EU) to allow 
people and goods to cross the borders without interference of border agencies. In this 
                                                 
7U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “How Long is the U.S. Border with Canada and Mexico?,” CBP 
INFO Center, accessed December 24, 2013, 
https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/578/kw/how%20long%20is%20canada%20border.  
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case, the Danish fear of neighboring countries presenting internal threats resembles the 
United States’ concern of dangers coming into its territory via its neighbors; it also 
provides an example of what might happen if the U.S. government strengthened its 
border with Canada. Denmark is the first nation in the SC to attempt to permanently 
increase internal border controls. 
There are many border vulnerabilities that a criminal can exploit for multiple 
gains. A government must keep the population safe and not solely by erecting a wall or 
posting a guard. The issues that affect the U.S. and Canadian relationship are far too 
complex to be handled with simple solutions; however, if a Schengen-like agreement will 
increase safety and the economic conditions for both nations, the countries may be better 
served by implementing it. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The thesis will examine the border enforcement and cooperation policies between 
the U.S. and Canada while exploring the strengths and weaknesses that the current 
interactions present. The thesis will then describe the way Denmark has handled its own 
external national security inside the EU. By reviewing what drove Denmark to join the 
SC and then change how it was applied in 2011, it is possible to see what changed and 
what can be learned from the events of 2011. These lessons can be applied to the U.S.-
Canadian border. Both examples of national diplomacy—Denmark and the EU, and U.S.-
Canada—deal with allies and friendly neighbors. The actions of one border nation will 
affect the other and how these nations see their role in self-defense are critical in 
understanding the relationship and applying the Denmark case to the U.S.  
The size and complexity of the border present a significant challenge and any 
tools that serve to better enhance the security of the neighboring countries can be seen as 
beneficial. The U.S.-Canada relationship and Denmark and its neighbors may have some 
differences in key traits and these variances may render any conclusion inapplicable to 
the other group if not acknowledged and expanded upon.  
Another critique of the SC, which could directly apply to the U.S.-Canadian 
border, is the limitation to geography. There is a concern that the Schengen area could 
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become too large for the consolidated security forces to be able to adequately protect the 
affected area, this in turn would allow a greater threat to be able to permeate the rest of 
the zone due to the nation that was overcome.8  
Europe’s legacy of warfare and violence, not present at the same scale in North 
America, complicated the negotiation of the SC. The lack of such a complex and 
conflicted legacy may make the process of creating a cooperative border system simpler 
for the U.S. and Canada. A significant factor for the United States is concern of another 
terrorist attack and the resolute stance to prevent one. This factor weighs into all border 
relations and must be properly acknowledged to validate any future policy changes. 
The SC model will not directly transfer over to the United States and Canada; 
however, some of the features can. One of the most significant features of the convention 
is the methods used to combine law enforcement across the various nations.9 Crimes are 
able to be investigated across the Schengen area with all of the resources and information 
being shared. These issues from the Schengen area can be dealt with in a U.S.-Canadian 
region in the same manner. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Authors from both sides of the U.S.-Canadian border have varied views of the 
importance of the border and the best way to deal with the other country. Two historical 
events have shaped these assessments. The first is the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) that went into effect January 1, 1994, binding the North American 
continent with similar economic interests and pursuits.10 NAFTA does not deal with 
security and laws in the same way and after 9/11 many issues were brought up. The 
                                                 
8
 Zaiotti, Cultures, 228. 
9
 Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 
5.  
10
 Jordi Díez, Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 3.  
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legacy of NAFTA shows an ability to work across the border in order to achieve a better 
financial agreement. The next step could be a much more porous and open border.11 
The second major impact on U.S. and Canadian relations is the events of 9/11 and 
is a necessary factor for any security debate. The debate shifts to the nature and location 
of response. Generally, international terrorism was accepted as a significant threat not to 
be underestimated. For some authors, the responses and actions already taken—such as 
the USA PATRIOT Act, an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, which 
increased border enforcement and introduced immigration reform—are necessary to 
protect the U.S. from terrorism and other threats. Michael LeMay highlights that the USA 
PATRIOT Act critics do not believe the government should have as much power because 
abuses are possible.12  
The United States established the Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) to 
solve the issue of numerous agencies having limited interactions and redundant 
missions.13 However, terrorism was not seen universally as the largest threat affecting 
North America. Some authors state the likelihood of attack by a terrorist is lower than 
purported.14 The threat level was used to justify increased security across the nation 
despite hard evidence of threats.  
The threat of terrorism has caused others to call for the border to be further 
strengthened and protected. Quoting a report from the U.S. Government Accounting 
Office (GAO), several U.S. senators called for a higher level of security and attention on 
the northern U.S. border. There was a belief the threat level from potential terrorist 
attacks was very high and not enough consideration was being placed on the inadequacies 
                                                 
11 Daniel Drache, Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America (Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 2004), 81.  
12
 Micahel LeMay, Guarding the Gates: Immigration and National Security (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006), 262. 
13 Ibid., 1. 
14
 Ibid., 254.  
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of protection.15 According to the report, only 32 miles of the more than 4000 miles were 
adequately guarded and secure. Fear of terrorist groups and weapons being smuggled 
across the rest of the border has fueled the debate over safety on the northern border.16  
Contrary to the widely held beliefs in continued border control and increased 
security, other authors believed that the United States was in a constant state of 
oscillation between high levels of border security and unilateralism, and open politics 
with a willingness to cooperate.17 The fundamental debate consists of those that would 
increase the border, and those that want to open the border.  
1. Denmark and the Schengen Convention 
The situation in Europe is different, beginning with the number of countries 
involved and the shared histories. An examination of every nation is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. For that reason, Denmark was chosen because it was the only nation to change 
the interpretation of SC and can be compared to higher and lower levels of border 
security policy.  
The research showed significant cooperation in border security and crime 
enforcement throughout the area encompassed by the SC, fittingly called the Schengen 
Area. The area has been extensively researched and each country has its own priorities 
and concerns. The inner borders are considered open and allows for unhindered passage 
throughout the area, while the outer borders are protected like any other nation’s border 
and checks are required to enter. In June 2005, over a decade after Denmark had joined, a 
new organization, Frontex, was created and tasked with coordinating external border  
 
 
                                                 
15 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Canada-US Border Security ‘Unacceptably Ineffective’: 
Report,” last modified February 2, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-u-s-border-security-
unacceptably-ineffective-report-1.1026095.  
16 Rob Hotakainen, “Biggest Border Threat to US,” McClatchy Newspapers, February 1, 2011, 
hhtp://www.mcclatchyde.com/2011/02/01/v-print/107891/biggest-border-threat-to-us-canada.html.  
17 LeMay, Guarding Gates, 267. 
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issues for all SC nations.18 This agency was crucial in defending the Schengen area from 
external threats and keeping the inner areas protected. A group could be created in the 
U.S and Canada to perform a similar function. 
2. Critics of the Denmark Argument 
Many opponents of Denmark’s policy change countered the given reasons for 
increased border protection. Many authors are critical of any unilateral move away from 
the Schengen Convention and believe that the best protections come from teamwork and 
shared diligence against crime and foreign threats.  
Ruben Zaiotti described the SC as a step up from the Westphalian system of 
nations and borders. He uses the term evolution to imply that the Schengen convention is 
an improvement due to the international cooperation of the SC across Europe. The system 
is not perfect. There are several key issues that have been discussed with the SC. One of 
the most pressing issues is the nature of the leadership for the convention.19 To apply to 
the U.S.-Canadian relationship, a neutral partnership of equality would have to be built 
in. 
3. Applying the Lessons to the U.S.-Canadian Relationship 
The writings that have examined the U.S.-Canadian border consistently describe 
the U.S. as the primary force that drives the direction and focus for future relations. The 
fact that the two countries are not on equal, financially or population wise, is a serious 
issue for political negotiations and bargaining priorities.20 The numbers will likely never 
balance out, but the need to have both parties protected and equitably handled will be a 
significant issue to ensure any future agreement is successful. Even though the United 
States has a larger gross domestic product (GDP), the other nations being dealt with will 
not acquiesce to a completely discriminatory or unacceptable term; the smaller nations 
                                                 
18 Zaiotti, Cultures, 167. 
19
 Ibid., 227.  
20 Robert A. Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World, (Washington 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), 34. 
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will still strive to be recognized as a peer and preserve its own objectives.21 The 
sovereignty of the other nations, as in Europe, must still be respected and recognized for 
any long lasting settlement. The basis for the Schengen Convention is that all of the 
nations have a say and are part of the larger group, rather than weaker states becoming 
subjugated to other nations. 
One particular issue for North America is the large difference of incomes and the 
method for dispensing welfare or any similar support for the less fortunate.22 This issue 
weighs into any discussion for open borders between two nations. Significant disparity 
between the nations can create significant points of contention that could further unravel 
or destroy any agreements. 
Another consistency throughout the literature of North America is the nature of 
the governments toward immigrations. Both Canada and the U.S. are nations of 
immigrants, neither one will end pursuit for a better life for one’s children, but the need 
to protect the nation’s children with security is equally balanced in the leadership’s 
minds. Canada is increasing the level of scrutiny applied to incoming immigrants; 
however there is a debate about the training thoroughness given to the gatekeepers. 
Author Arne Kislenko states that too many people are screened by too few with limited 
training allowing for holes in the proverbial net.23  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis will examine the evidence that was used to support the change of the 
Danish government for border policy and apply the lessons learned to the United States; 
to improve security from external threats; whether they are real or exaggerated is another 
issue all together. To best understand the various views of border policy, the proposed  
 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 99. 
22
 Drache, Borders Matter, 58.  
23
 Arne Kislenko, The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 318. 
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thesis will seek to understand the Danish government’s motivation for various levels of 
border protection or openness at different times. The same analysis will be performed on 
the U.S. and Canadian policies for border security.   
A learning lesson will be the 2011 events in Denmark when the country, for 
separate political reasons, tried to change the level of security required under the 
Schengen agreement and increase border protections. By examining the increased border 
security it is possible to determine if the change resulted in a safer nation. The thesis will 
look at Denmark’s acceptance of the convention, how it interpreted it and why there was 
a change in compliance with the rules. Lessons will then be applied to the North 
American situation to demonstrate how to improve the security and economic scenario 
for both nations. 
Newspaper articles published during the 2011 situation show a preponderance of 
pessimism over the legality of the change Denmark suggested. The newspapers show 
what the media believed regarding the support and dissent for the open borders present in 
Denmark. The coverage illustrates an uphill battle from the beginning for the Danish 
government in selling the case to the rest of the people and the other nations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The introduction introduces the overall subjects and issues that will be dealt with. 
Following this introduction, Chapter II examines the threats on the border and steps 
currently being taken to mitigate them and safeguard the two nations.  
Chapter III will look into the policies of the U.S. and Canada borders from early 
stages through the modern era in order to understand what motives and changes have 
taken place over time between the two nations. 
Chapter IV will look into the Schengen Convention. In order to understand the 
complexities of the Denmark border, the SC will be described and the program will be 
broken down by its parts and unique parts. 
The next chapter will look into the Danish border situation and examine how that 
nation joined and later modified the SC, and what motivated the change. The cooperative 
 11 
nature of the SC and Denmark is important in understanding how border changes can 
affect the allies of the EU. When Denmark made changes that were important to its local 
population, it did not consider the impact these changes would have on the larger 
Schengen area. The ruling Danish government lost control of the parliament before 
completing the planned border changes, but the possible impact to cooperation between 
the states was significant. 
The final chapter will conclude with lessons of the events in Denmark and 
provide a method for applying the lessons for greater border cooperation between 
neighbors. The concluding chapter will review the thesis and demonstrate the possibility 
of applying the SC to North America. 
The thesis examines threats responses present at the U.S.-Canadian border. The 
DHS coordinates with representatives from law enforcement, military and civilian 
entities. Threats include weapons, drug dealing entities and terrorist groups. All of the 
challenges must be met to protect the border. Prior to the attack of 9/11, the U.S.-
Canadian border was similar to the Schengen Convention. The cooperation between the 
two nations remains today. The military presence on the soil of the two states has 
increased and the collaboration between the various groups that strive to protect the 
border remains high. 
Europe instituted the Schengen Convention to have open borders between 
participating nations. It allows for goods and people to travel between the participating 
areas. In 2011, Denmark increased border security for its internal borders despite having 
other SC nations surrounding it on all sides. The lessons of Denmark are levels of 
authority and the impact that small changes on one scale of politics can have on the other 
larger areas. It is important for governments to consider the impacts on multiple scales in 
a global arena and balance the interests of the local populations with the significant needs 
of the partner nations. The U.S. and Canada can benefit from balancing the interests of 
some members of the population, those that would prefer significant reduction in 




outside of the country can deliver. In addition, by returning to an open border and 
creating a larger protective zone around the two nations; it is possible to push the threat 
as far from the mainland as possible. 
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II. BORDER THREATS AND DEFENSE 
The two aspects of a border that determine it shape and function are the threats 
that are present as well as the capabilities of the nations that are utilizing the forces 
available. This chapter will look at the types of forces utilized on the U.S.-Canadian 
border as well as the technology that the border agencies utilize for enforcing the border 
and border rules. The second section of the chapter will look into the general threats that 
are present on the border and what measures may be used against them. 
A. CURRENT U.S. BORDER SECURITY 
A nation’s border defines both its geographical and defensive zones. A nation’s 
territory plays a part in the creation of the state identity and there is significant literature 
discussing the importance of the border in forming it. The state’s border is also a marker 
for resource rights and ownership.24 Disputes between the borderlines of states have been 
the cause of wars since the inception of the border and remain the source of conflict 
today. The neighbors serve an important role in helping define the border as well. A 
nation’s border shows the international community and citizenry where states begin and 
end. The state must adequately secure and guard its border to ensure internal security. 
Layered responses and technologies protect the border. The U.S. customs and border 
patrol (CBP) is the primary agency inside of DHS responsible for the border. There are 
eight sections spread across the 15 northern U.S. border states.25  
This chapter will examine the various methods of defense, the entities that want to 
exploit weaknesses in the security systems and the specific strengths that are currently 
present in the border. The thesis will look at the U.S.-Canadian border and breakdown the 
security into three categories: hardware, people, and programs. 
                                                 
24 Étienne Balibar, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans. James 
Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7. 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Border Protection Report to Congress on 
Ongoing DHS Initiatives to Improve Security along the US Northern Border, 2008, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=483993 .  
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1. Hardware and Technology 
The initial examination of border security procedures for the thesis begins with 
physical devices and tools. The agencies guarding the border select technology based on 
years of trial and error. Governments must improve technology as it improves, so does 
the tools of both the guards and those trying to circumvent the system. The guards keep 
watch for threats and contraband, and the groups that want to avoid detection keep 
attempting to foil the technology. New technology must be fully countered or loopholes 
and liabilities will be exploited in the defensive systems. 
There are 1459 radiation portal monitors (RPM) placed along the ports and entry 
points across the border of U.S.26 There are 444 RPM placed at the ports that scan 99 
percent of all cargo containers and the rest are along the land border are able to fully scan 
100 percent of the vehicular traffic that enters the U.S.27 The RPM is a tool that assists 
the border guards with nuclear material defense. 
Towers with infrared and visible light cameras provide a lookout for areas in 
conjunction with radar, magnetic, and seismographic sensors continuously tracking a 
given sector and reporting any findings to nearby personnel to create a network across the 
border.28 There was also utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide 
mobile detection and roving manned patrols. All of these systems would combine into a 
common operating picture (COP) in order to see the overall picture and ensure border 
security. Each type of sensors looks for specific targets, with foot traffic creating one type 
of signature and vehicles another.  
                                                 
26 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Department of Homeland Security before the Homeland 
Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security (February 26, 2012) (statement of Michael J. 
Fisher), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM11/20130226/100300/HHRG-113-HM11-Wstate-FisherM-
20130226.pdf, 3. 
27 U.S. Department of Security [DHS], US Customs and Border Protection’s Radiation Portal 
Monitors at Seaports (OIG-13-26), January 2013, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-
26_Jan13.pdf, 3.  
28 Government Accounting Office, Secure Border Initiative, DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 
Investment in Key Technology Program, May 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10340.pdf. 
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2. Programs 
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. and Canada were working together to secure the border 
from criminal groups. Post 9/11, with terrorism becoming a larger concern, the newly 
created DHS took over the 1998 border plans fittingly called America’s Shield Initiative 
(ASI) and 1997’s Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS).29 DHS inherited all 
of the program’s technology and resources and strive to secure against many possible 
threats. The Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) replaced the ASI program to 
secure the border with technology and personnel optimized over vast distances and 
limited budgets.  
The Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, canceled SBInet January 
2011 due to excessive cost and not believing the program meets requirements for a safe 
border.30 After the cancelation, the Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) replaced it with a 
similar technological plan for towers on the border maintaining vigilance against 
intrusion.31 While the universal plan of one system for the entire border may be finished, 
many of the lessons and objectives will be carried over into new programs. Despite the 
failure of the program, the objective and the technology remain viable solutions to the 
dilemmas at the border. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the expected interactions of the various systems that would 
communicate in the SBInet system and illustrates much of the same technology without 





                                                 
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, A Review of Remote Surveillance Technology Along U.S. 
Land Border, accessed November 1, 2013, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-15_Dec05.pdf, 1,  
30 Alice Lipowicz, New border strategy to incorporate SBInet-like capabilities, March 18, 2011, 
http://gcn.com/articles/2011/03/15/dhs-buying-sbinetlike-system-for-border-despite-uncertainties-gao-
says.aspx.  
31 Reed Abrahamson, “The Fall of SBInet, The Rise of Integrated Fixed Towers,” Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal, no. 25, (Spring 2011), 746. 
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aircraft being deployed on both the northern and southern U.S. borders. As of 2012 the 
U.S. Congress has authorized CPB to operate 24 Predator MQ-9 UAVs but 10 are fully 
funded.32  
 
Figure 2.  SBInet33 
3. Personnel 
The current U.S. border patrol traces its roots to a program that started in 1924 
with the Labor Appropriation Act. Afterwards, border patrol became the agency 
responsible for securing the border between the inspection stations; the following year the 
                                                 
32 Dan Parsons, “Predators Allow Border Agencies to Reallocate Resources,” National Defense 
Magazine, January 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/ 
2014/January/Pages/PredatorsAllow BorderAgenciestoReallocateResources.aspx. 
33 Government Accounting Office, Secure Border Initiative, DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 
Investment in Key Technology Program, May 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10340.pdf , 4. 
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mission was expanded to include the coastline.34 Each border had a primary control 
center, the northern border hub was located in Detroit, Michigan; and southern border 
was ran El Paso, Texas. 
Until 1940, the authority for this program fell under the Department of Labor; 
however, the threat of a coming war in Europe forced the Department of Justice to take 
over the nation’s security. In 1952, legal changes granted additional authority to border 
agents and allowed them to enter a vessel to search for suspected illegal aliens anywhere 
inside the U.S.35 Further modifications followed large threats to the nation including 
hijacked aircraft, drugs and the current fear of terrorism. 
The managers and guards on the border make up one of the most important parts 
of an immigration and border security system. The border is only as secure as the 
personnel who are available to enforce the security and provide for the response to 
attempted incursions. The northern border does not have the same numbers of 
enforcement officers as the southern one, but each has increased its numbers since 9/11. 
The 2012 border patrol numbers show the significant disparity between the south and 
north, with 2,206 stationed to the north and 18,516 on the southern border.36 A greater 
number of agents on the southern border have yielded a significantly higher amount of 
arrests, with 4,210 people taken from the northern border and 356,873 apprehended on 
the southern border.37 The number of apprehensions does not take away the risks of 
terrorism, smuggling, narcotics and weapons into the country from a seemingly less 
protected route.  
                                                 
34 U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Patrol History,” January 5, 
2010, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml. 
35 U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Patrol History,” January 5, 
2010, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml. 
36 U.S. Border Patrol, “2012 Sector Profile,” accessed December 20, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/usbp_
sector_profile.ctt/usbp_sector_profile.pdf. 
37 Ibid.  
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After the events of 9/11, the newly created DHS absorbed the border patrol and 
combined it with other border agencies to form the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP).38 
B. THREATS 
With an understanding of the methods and resources used to protect the border, 
threats are other side of the equation to be examined. The specific threats will be broken 
down into: the terrorism threat, the types of illegal narcotics and routes used to smuggle 
into and out of both countries, and finally, the various weapon types possibly taken into 
the country from the northern border, to include nuclear, chemical, and biological. 
1. Contraband between the Nations 
One seemingly harmless threat from both sides of the border is illegal goods and 
drugs, either legal or illegal in one country or the other. In addition to the narcotics 
smuggled into and out of the U.S., the material is also brought into the two nations and is 
difficult to stop due to the inert nature of the substances. Ecstasy is a serious issue for 
both nations. Entities producing the drug require significant amounts of contraband 
chemicals. In a 2004 congressional hearing, Mark Souder stated that U.S. agencies made 
acquisition of the needed chemicals difficult but criminal organizations are able to get the 
materials in Canada and smuggle them into the U.S.39 In a 2012 U.S. State Department 
report, the cooperation of U.S. and Canada has created further roadblocks for 
procurement of the chemicals.40 An additional issue that comes from the import of illegal 
drugs is the profit that enables the groups to continue and increase their ventures, the 
more funding the groups get the more they are able to do.  
                                                 
38 U.S. Border Patrol, “Border Patrol History.”  
39 Northern ICE: Stopping Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical Smuggling Across the U.S.-Canada 
Border Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 108th 
Cong.(2004) (statement of Mark E. Souder), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108hhrg99654/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg99654.pdf, 3.  
40 U.S. Department of State, 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol 1, accessed 
January 1 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187109.pdf.  
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The entire border has key zones that used for transporting the material back and 
forth. The primary drugs brought into the U.S. are ecstasy and marijuana, while the drugs 
that travel through the U.S. into Canada is cocaine from South America.41 British 
Columbia is a significant source of ecstasy and marijuana, with smaller amounts coming 
from Ontario and Quebec. Other drugs, including gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), 
ketamine, and methamphetamine also go south to the U.S.42 Money travels the opposite 
direction in many instances. The health and welfare of the state’s populace is threatened 
by illegal drugs as well as legal products that are not inspected for safety compliance.  
There are significant amounts of drugs that enter the country from the 
U.S./Mexican border and the amount of this contraband shows no sign of decreasing in 
the foreseeable future. The significant disparity between the two borders is exemplified 
by the amount of marijuana that was intercepted in 2012 according to the CBP in Table 1. 
The table shows that there are contraband shipments crossing the border into the U.S. 
from Canada and, while smaller, still present a risk that requires a defensive response. 
 
Table 1.   U.S. Border Patrol Seizure 201243  
                                                 
41 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy 2012, 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, accessed December 20, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/national_northern_border_counternarcotics_strateg
y_.pdf, 4.  
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 U.S. Border Patrol, “2012 Sector Profile.” 
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2. Terrorism 
Terrorism in the United States before 9/11 was not seen as a significant fear 
despite events like the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and other small-scale attacks. 
The current threat comes from groups like Al-Qaida that strive to remove the U.S. and 
allies from Islamic world and create a wave of rebellion throughout the world against 
western ideals.44 
U.S. government agencies do not agree upon the definition of terrorism. DHS 
defines terrorism: 
Any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources and is a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other 
subdivision of the United States; and, appears to be intended to intimidate 
or coerce a civilian population, or to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.45 
Although official organizations use different terms, the fundamental issue is the 
threat of any group that would use violence to achieve its means. These groups must not 
be permitted to engage in deadly activity. In addition, government forces must prevent 
extremely dangerous weapons from being acquired; this includes any WMD or other type 
armaments.  
The term terrorist is used to describe many different groups and ideologies. The 
threat presented by any subversive group, regardless of the motivation must be dealt with 
prior to successful acts of violence. The nature of terrorism and its typical lack of state 
support or traditional armies create a situation where every unknown subject is a potential 
hostile threat and every vehicle can be transport for terror. 
Terrorist attacks have been motivated by many different reasons and the list is 
outside the scope of the thesis, but the principle concepts of terrorism and its motivation 
                                                 
44 Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 169.  
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 1st ed., 2011, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf.   
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remain an ever present threat. The inspiration driving a terrorist group may even have 
legitimate reasoning, which a state can deal with to remove the incentive for engaging in 
terrorism.  
3. Weapons 
Both conventional and unconventional arms can be transferred between states; 
laws allowing some types of weapons on one side of the border but not the other. The 
thesis will examine the general classification of weapons as nuclear, biological, chemical, 
and other types of weapons.  
Each of the types of weapons provides their own threats and levels of harm. The 
threat also changes the tools required to counter each type. Smugglers can break complex 
systems into smaller segments for easier movement and harder detection. The next 
section will look at the differences between the various weapon types that aid in 
prevention. 
a. Chemical/Biological Weapons 
Biological weapons may be one of the oldest forms of non-conventional arms 
with uses recorded in 1346 when plague-ridden bodies were flung into walled cities to 
wreak havoc and defeat enemy soldiers.46 The armies using the techniques did not 
understand the science but the effects were undeniable. As technology improved and 
scientific knowledge grew, the understanding of what caused disease and what would 
really prevent illness allowed for the use of biological agents to inflect pain and suffering 
upon the adversary.  
Various methods can be utilized to create biological weapons. In addition, the 
dispersal system can be extremely limiting due to the requirement of keeping the 
organism alive in order to infect the intended targets. All of these factors will influence 
what weapon is being pursued by the group and what steps can be taken to intervene. 
Two researchers, Theodore Rosebury and Elvin Kabat of Columbia University in 1942, 
                                                 
46 Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to 
Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 3. 
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reported on the effects and effectiveness of a multitude of biological agents.47 The report 
shows the large amount of hazardous organisms able to harm or kill and examines the 
mortality rate between viruses and bacteria. Keeping material virile to infect with 
maximum results is one of the most significant limitations of biological agents.48  
Unlike chemical weapons, the biological agent must be kept alive to be useful and 
this complicates the dispersal, storage, and transportation systems. The variations 
between the different agents were examined in order to determine the best weapons and 
most effective arms. The research looked at incubation time for infections, lethality rates, 
as well as methods of immunizations.49 Terrorist and criminal groups can use multiple 
agents so vigilance against many threats, from low to high level, is necessary. 
Multiple efforts can be taken to counter the different biological agents but are 
only effective against an identified threat. The best defense is to prevent their presence 
before they can be used, however the reality of the threat prevents this goal from being 
completely feasible so internal safeguards must also be implemented.  
The differences between biological and chemical weapons are the living 
organisms that are part of a biological agent versus the non-organic composition of the 
chemical category. Historical uses of chemical weapons can be traced back to World War 
1 in 1915 with both sides of the conflict using various chemicals to destroy enemy troops, 
to the more recent terrorist organization of Aum Shrinikyo that attacked Japanese 
civilians on two different occasions with sarin gas and caused 12 fatalities in 1995.50 
Both of these examples show dedicated and well-funded examples of chemical weapon 
manufacture. The Aum Shrinikyo attacks suffered from a limited timeline and therefore 
were not as successful as they might have been with more time to execute their original 
plan. 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 28.  
48 Ibid., 28. 
49 Ibid., 30. 
50 Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2006), 330. 
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In addition the material that can be combined to create extremely hazardous 
chemicals are by themselves common necessities to modern living and will not be 
difficult to gather. The abundance of resources makes prevention much harder. As 
dangerous as the chemical and biological weapon may be, the next weapon set is 
potentially the most lethal system possible.  
b. Nuclear/Radiological Devices 
The nuclear or radiological threat is always one of the most dire and serious topics 
in a discussion of weapons. Once the nuclear weapon has been smuggled into the country 
and is ready to be used there is very little that can be done to minimize damage and loss 
of life. Since the first split of the atom, the technological enhancements have made the 
weapons larger and more effective. 
The most significant aspect of nuclear weapon safety comes from proper control 
of existing stockpiles and regulation and enforcement of all critical elements and 
technologies that can be utilized in constructing a device. Nuclear bombs are not the only 
devices categorized under nuclear and radiological devices. There are experts that believe 
the threat of nuclear weapons being used against the U.S. is much lower today with the 
end of the Cold War and the removal of so many armed and fueled missiles from both the 
U.S. and USSR and the new threat is almost welcomed.51 Reducing the threat of global 
nuclear war does not remove the need of continued vigilance against rogue states and 
terrorist groups from achieving nuclear capabilities; as well as the danger these entities 
pose to smaller areas subject to significant destruction and long lasting radiological 
effects. 
Some scholars believe that most terrorist groups are not interested in becoming 
nuclear-armed terrorist. Matthew Bunn articulates the issue with nuclear weapons and 
their side effects for a terrorist group: 
                                                 
51 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 84. 
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Most terrorist groups have no interest in threatening or committing large-
scale nuclear destruction. Focused on local issues, seeking to become the 
governments of the areas now controlled by their enemies (and thus not 
wanting to destroy those areas), and needing to build political support that 
might be undermined by the horror and wanton destruction of innocent life 
resulting from a nuclear attack, all but a few terrorist groups probably 
would not want to get and use a nuclear bomb even if they could readily 
do so.52 
Nuclear motivated groups would find an intact device much easier to use than 
creating the technology from scratch due to the complex science and research involved.53 
There is evidence that the group Al Qaeda is actively pursuing nuclear technology in 
order to attack western countries and spread fear throughout perceived enemy states. 
In addition to nuclear weapons, radiological material can be unleashed on a 
population by means of destruction to a nuclear power plant or conventional explosives 
merged with radiation to unleash a dirty bomb. The dirty bomb can best be prevented 
with the interdiction of radioactive material at the border. The specific amount of damage 
that would be caused from these devices may not be as large as traditional nuclear 
devices, but the psychological effects that the attacks would have on the population may 
be very significant. The prevention of attacks at nuclear sites is a much more complicated 
and separate issue that cannot be solved with better border security. 
c. Other Types of Weapons 
The remaining types of arms include traditional guns, rifles and pistols, 
explosives and similar devices. There are legitimate uses and legal purposes behind these 
devices and will always be imported through the country. The issue comes with groups 
smuggling the weapons and circumventing the monitoring system that the states have set 
up to ensure lawful use and ownership. When groups or individuals obtain weapons and 
are able to do so beyond the limits of the law, the population can bear the consequences. 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 89. 
53 Ibid., 90.  
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Each nation has the right to regulate the types of weapons that may be transported 
across its border lines and to determine what arms the population may possess; these 
regulations further dictate what will be sought due to restrictions by citizenry outside of 
official channels. These desires can create markets much like the U.S. ban of alcohol 
during prohibition of the 1920s in which criminals seek to facilitate banned weapons and 
munitions. Both countries must ensure maximum effort by the border personnel to 
prevent these exclusionary items in order to keep a positive relationship between the 
neighboring states.  
The creation of the DHS pushed the U.S. to look into the practice of border 
management and defense with one agency responsible for both. DHS attempted to use 
one method to defend all of the various types of border. It did not work and the defense 
of the border was altered to focus on the goal of prevention of terrorist threats and 
contraband entering the U.S. The threats are numerous and varied. Each one presents a 
different challenge and must be prevented in the best manner that retains the ability for 
lawful traffic to continue to traverse the border. The reason for border enforcement is to 
keep the threat out of the country and prohibit abuses that endanger the people of the 
nation. The next chapter will examine the specific policies that have been implemented 
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III. U.S.-CANADIAN BORDER POLICIES 
Despite ever-present threats on a country’s borders, a nation must interact with 
the outside world and cooperate with its neighbors to prosper and defend itself. By 
examining the history of the U.S. and Canada and tracing their shared development, it is 
possible to understand how they have arrived at their present state of interaction. The 
chapter will first examine the history that the two states shared and then delve into the 
current level of cooperation existing between them. Except for the War of 1812, the two 
nations are peaceful allies, however, the origin of both countries is an important detail 
that helps to understand the differences between the two nations and why the border is in 
the condition it is. 
A. BORDER POLICY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II 
After the American Revolution, the U.S. sought to expand its territory and fought 
to expand westward. Colonial powers occupied much of the territory across the 
remaining sections of North America so certain amounts of conflict or negotiation with 
the nations were inevitable. Only one large scale conflict directly threatened the 
continued existence of the U.S., the War of 1812. In the early years of the U.S., there was 
a significant period of fear and the threat of war loomed between the U.S. and the region 
to the north.54 There were three reasons ultimately preventing war from developing 
between the territory north of the U.S. and the U.S.: the allegiance between the northern 
area and the UK, the high cost of a battle, and the profit that the commercial ventures 
gained with the current groups on both sides of the border. A primary factor that helped 
keep both sides from full conflict was the alliance that the territory destined to become 
Canada had with the UK and the side effects of war.55 A driving force behind the 
expansion for the U.S. was Manifest Destiny.56 The term, coined by Editor John Louis 
                                                 
54 Mason Wade, The United States and Canada (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 40. 
55 William T. R. Fox, A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985), 34. 
56 Wade, The United States and Canada, 43. 
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O’Sullivan, expressed the belief that the expansion of the country was destiny.57 The 
desire put the area of Canada into the sights of some groups, and Secretary of State W. H. 
Seward, that sought to have one nation throughout the entire continent.58 In addition, 
there was such a strong connection and working relationship that a change would do 
more harm than good and only create turmoil between the UK and the U.S.59  
Despite the working peace, a drive towards absorbing Canada was very strong at 
the end of the U.S. Civil War. A resurgence of Manifest Destiny in the U.S. drove the 
population of Canada to create a separate nation in 1867. The new state, called the 
Dominion of Canada state remained allied with the UK but was able to maintain a 
moderate level of independence.60 This dominion remained loyal to the UK but permitted 
a level of autonomy that grew through the years to a much larger and independent nature. 
Once the U.S. pushed west across the continent, two coastlines and vast 
geographical features made up its borders. It was the primitive travel options, rather than 
the vast national borders, that inhibited long distances and transnational movement. 
Under the Monroe Doctrine, Europe was pressured to stay out of the politics of the 
American continents and in turn the America’s stayed out of that part of the world.61 
After World War I, this began to change with the emergence of the U.S. as a new super 
power.62 The large oceans that served as natural barriers removed a level of stress from 
the equation and allowed the U.S. and Canada to stay in North America. Once the two 
nations saw their fates intertwined, they declared mutual protection over each other.63 
The bond between the U.S. and Canada became one of two concerned neighbors that 
worked together without the desire to conquer the other’s territory.  
                                                 
57 LeMay, Guarding Gates, 37. 
58 Wade, The United States and Canada, 43. 
59 Fox, Continent Apart, 37. 
60 Wade, The United States and Canada, 43.  
61 Fox, Continent Apart, 40. 
62 Ibid., 6. 
63 Ibid., 13.  
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1. Cooperation for Mutual Defense 
After achieving relative independence in 1867, the Canadian government 
balanced its interests between British and U.S. priorities. The bond between the U.S. and 
Canada grew stronger. The Ogdensburg declaration of 1940 is a strong example of the 
unified bond between Canada and the U.S. The declaration created a board for bilateral 
defense of the nations. It also elevated Canada to an equal U.S. regarding military supply 
contracts and support.64 
In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged the U.S. “would not stand 
idly by if Canada was attacked.”65 Two days later, the Canadian Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King match the agreement with his pledge to prevent an enemy attack of the 
U.S. over Canadian air, sea, or land66 The two nations grew closer in many ways, but the 
emergence of a significant threat from Nazi Germany solidified the relationship further in 
the years leading up to and during the second World War. 
Many significant events in Europe have impacted North America. While forces in 
North America were fighting in the War of 1812, French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte 
created a vast army that fought many Eurasian Kingdoms, forcing Britain to reduce 
resources available for the North American war.67 After Bonaparte’s defeat, the newly 
formed power vacuum had to be replaced with a complex system, known as the Concert 
of Europe that kept the peace in Europe for almost a century.68 This new power dynamic 
ensured that European kingdoms would focus away from North America and not provide 
a large military force for the U.S. or Canada to need to repel. With limited threats, the 
                                                 
64 Craig Stone, “Defence Procurement and Industry,” in Canada’s National Security in the Post 9/11 
World: Strategy, Interests, and Threat, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2012), 83.  
65 Fox, Continent Apart, 12.  
66 Ibid, 13.  
67 Ibid., 32.  
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two nations were able to spend funds on other national priorities and to improve their 
infrastructures, increasing their populations and national wealth.  
2. The Rights to Enter and Leave 
The two nations were able to continue to peacefully maintain both their civil 
relationship and extremely long border. The 1796 Treaty of Amity Commerce and 
Navigation demonstrates this peaceable coexistence. This treaty, informally known as 
Jay’s Treaty, showed cooperation between the two nations and a willingness to work 
together for prosperity. The third article specifically deals with commerce and access for 
the populations of the two areas to intermingle and go into each other’s zones for these 
endeavors and allows citizens to travel across the area for trade and commerce. 69 
One of the largest issues for the expanding U.S. was space and population 
management. The dilemma of too much space and not enough population was undertaken 
by loose immigrations policies that pushed to have more people to populate and work the 
emerging countryside.70 The concept of citizenship was wrapped around the issue of 
immigration as early as 1799 with a judicial ruling regarding citizenship rules.71 The 
ruling of Chief Justice Ellsworth of the Circuit Court of the U.S. declared that the U.S. 
could not afford to lose its citizens based on its size compared to small population, so 
U.S. citizenship was not something to easily be capitulated.72 
The system of immigration control paperwork, the modern passport program, 
significantly impacted the ability of people to enter and exit the U.S. Initially, U.S. 
passports were for identification and an acknowledgement that an action was taken to 
enter another region. In 1856, the ability to grant or withhold approval fell under the 
purview of the U.S. Secretary of State. The secretary could not remove the person’s 
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ability to travel to other countries since the need for a passport did not coincide with the 
permission to enter and exit a state.73 It changed when the need for a passport became 
mandatory in 1918 and a citizen could finally not leave the country without having the 
proper clearance through a stamped passport. In 1926, the U.S. State Department took 
control of the Passport Program.74 The U.S. passport requirement lapsed between the two 
world wars but with other nations still required passports so there was no need for U.S. 
legislation. In 1941, another law was added once more requiring passports for U.S. 
citizens to travel abroad.75 Passport denial became a way to prevent undesired travel from 
population groups that were deemed counter to U.S. political or social order. In 1950, this 
authority was codified by the Internal Security Act of 1950, when groups aligned with the 
communist party were denied access to passports. Judicial appeals to the laws of control 
ultimately resulted in challenges to the status quo and a right for people to travel out of 
the country; however the result was limitation based on threats presented by individuals 
and the need to review any issuance prohibitions on a case by case basis under a U.S. 
State department 1980 passport issue regulation.76 The state department felt that 
individual freedoms had to be balanced with protecting the nation against possible 
threats.  
Passport issuance is one aspect of population tracking; the other part is deciding 
who is allowed to come to the country from other nations. Different eras have had 
varying policies for the people that are allowed to enter the country and some of the most 
restrictive occurred with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act, also known 
as the McCarran Act of 1952.77 A wide swath of people were defined as undesirable and 
not allowed to enter the U.S. for reasons that would be illegal by today’s standards; 
individuals included homosexuals and communists. 
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B. POLICIES OF THE COLD WAR 
Even before the allies won WWII, the U.S. was shifting from an agricultural 
nation that pursued isolationism and separation to a world power. After WWII, the two 
superpowers, USSR and the U.S. became tangled in a world wide effort to build allies for 
their respective and in many ways opposite goals. The Cold War did not escalate into a 
full conflict, but the nature of the conflict and the scale of the number of countries that 
were involved made it as significant as the previous world wars in terms of global impact. 
In North America, both nations were allied against the communist threat. A strong 
example of this bond is the Canadian uranium mining conducted during World War II 
and continuing in support of the major build up for the Soviet Cold War arms race.78 The 
partnership did not last long as the global situation changed and the demand for 
additional sources of uranium made the U.S. look elsewhere after 1959.79  
One of the largest impacts of WWII on North America was the strengthened 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada. There were two significant advantages that the 
U.S. and Canada had at the end of the war. The first benefit was the lack of damage to the 
manufacturing and agrarian infrastructure of both nations unlike many of the war-torn 
nations of Europe and Asia.80 The other advantage was the knowledge both countries 
gained regarding early intervention in global conflict.81 Prior to this conflict, there was a 
common view of isolation and avoidance until absolutely no option remained. Canada 
worked with the rest of its allies to maintain an overseas presence and reduce the threat of 
another global conflict. Victory propelled the two nations to become much more involved 
in global politics and to see themselves as stronger allies. 
The fall of the Axis nations brought a new team dynamic, the western world 
versus the USSR and its partners. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came 
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out of this new threat in 1949.82 This multinational organization included European 
nations, the U.S. and Canada; the inclusion of these two nations demonstrates the 
importance of European stability for the North America and their continued involvement 
in global defense.83 While not exclusively a U.S.-Canadian agreement, it was important 
in bonding the two nations and even had strong early support in Canada.84 Both nations 
were interested in securing the globe against threats before they could impact the 
continent. The Canadian NATO membership did not mean all U.S. interests were 
automatically supported by Canada. A prime example of the ability to act differently 
from the U.S. was shown with the Cuban situation of 1962 that showed a willingness to 
support the U.S. but not alter political relationships with Cuba.85  
The United Nations (UN), founded in 1945, was another organization created 
after WWII that altered the global scene and strongly supported by the U.S. and 
Canada.86 Canada may not have had the same capabilities as the U.S., but its support for 
the UN is significant, including providing personnel as well as membership in the UN 
Atomic Energy Commission.87  
The geography of the North American continent was a crucial part in the defense 
of the U.S. against the USSR during the Cold War. The shortest path for a Soviet missile 
to hit the U.S. was to travel over Canada. This looming threat was significant to the 
relationship of the North American nations. The creation of North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), in 1957, served to defend the airspace over the two 
nations and help detect incoming missiles from other nations, specifically the Union of 
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Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).88 The U.S. and Canada provide personnel and 
leadership for the organization, and there are headquarters in both the U.S. and Canada.  
The Canadian government had to allow the construction of multiple radars and 
close cooperation with the U.S. military facilitated the radar system for early detection of 
missile attacks. The cooperation between the two did equate to a blanket pass for U.S. 
forces to be provided full military presence and forward operating bases in Canada.89 
The history between the two nations has had times of competing interests with 
unforeseen impacts on wide groups of individuals. One of these examples is the events 
surrounding the production of the Canadian aircraft CF-105. This aircraft was touted as 
the Canadian solution to defense that would enrich its economic possibilities.90 The 
various parts of the original plan involved multiple nations for production, but all of the 
other nations stopped production and had to be renewed by the Canadians.91 The program 
was canceled due to cost overruns, a loss of every other potential customer, and a view 
that aircraft would not be adequate. Many Canadians blamed the failure on the U.S., but 
the reality was much more benign, mismanagement and overconfidence.  
C. AFTER THE 9/11 ATTACK 
The attacks of New York and Washington, DC immediately pushed the border 
and the threat of terrorism into the forefront for politicians on both sides of the border. In 
the U.S., the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council were 
created on October 2001.92 Both of these organizations were given to the executive 
office, while the Department of Homeland Defense was drafted as a new cabinet 
department and formally active November 25, 2002.93 The new DHS was lauded by 
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President Bush after approving the bill by saying “the homeland security act of 
2002…restructures and strengthens the executive branch of the federal government to 
better meet the threat to our homeland posed by terrorism… to help prevent, protect 
against, and respond to acts of terrorism.”94 
 The new department changed the way that the U.S. government interacted and 
handled the border. All of the personnel of the Immigration, Naturalization Service (INS) 
were absorbed and re-tasked inside of the new department. There was significant blame 
placed on the border agency and its failures after the attack even though there were no 
hijackers that snuck across the border illegally.95 DHS focused on terrorism prevention 
and moved immigration away from the forefront. Within the DHS, there were two 
bureaus that focused on the separate parts of the border; the Directorate of Border 
Transportation Security and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.96 
In December 2003, the Canadian government created the Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada organization that preforms many of the similar 
functions that DHS does in the U.S.97 The next prime minister shortened the title of the 
department to Public Safety Canada (PSC) but kept the priorities of infrastructure 
protection and emergency management.98 The new department absorbed the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 
and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).99 These three agencies perform the 
core functions of border protection and defense inside of Canada and the new PSC was 
specifically tasked with keeping the nation safe in the event of any emergency. 
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NORTHCOM, in the footsteps of NORAD, was a new U.S. military command 
setup in 2002 to coordinate between the various levels of government and military groups 
that would focus on the North American continent.100 NORTHCOM is based in Petersen 
Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. NORTHCOM encompassed Canada, 
Mexico, and several nations in the Caribbean, in addition 500 miles of the ocean was 
included.101 In addition to military cooperation, NORTHCOM was also directed to work 
directly with DHS in order to maximize protection of U.S. soil. There is not the same 
level of cooperation with Canada inside NORTHCOM as there is in NORAD; however 
there is a concrete plan to cooperate in the face of an emergency and allow forces from 
either state to cross the border to provide assistance to the other.102  
In Canada, a 2006 action created a similar organization to assist with military 
forces for the homeland of Canada called Canada COM.103 As with NORTHCOM, this 
organization was tasked with Canada, the U.S., Mexico, the Caribbean, and the artic and 
based in Ottawa. The change of having military forces ready to respond inside of the 
nation represented a significant change from the previous policy of only looking to the 
international arena for the use of military force.104 The Canadian military is tasked with 
defending the maritime region of Canada but is limited by the capability of its aircraft 
inventory.105 
The capabilities of the U.S. intelligence system was one of the largest concerns 
about the terrorism threat inside the U.S. and fueled a drive to reform and improve 
perceived shortcomings with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004.106 The bill created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in order to facilitate 
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the flow of intelligence and gather the different intelligence agencies with a single head 
to ensure information goes to the decision makers and action is taken as soon as possible. 
In order to ensure travelers were fully vetted, one of the requirements of the 
intelligence reform bills was to require all people to possess a valid passport to enter the 
U.S.107 The program, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) went into effect 
June 1, 2009.108 Despite requests of Canadian officials to delay the start date due to the 
concerns about the added level of scrutiny between the two borders would harm 
relation.109.  
D. U.S.-CANADIAN COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS 
One of the first cooperative measures taken in late 2001was the Smart Border 
Accord in December 2001.110 One of the agencies set up from the accord was the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET).111 The team includes members from the 
CBSA, RCMP, CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. 
Coast Guard to coordinate the flow of goods and people across the border while 
preventing unauthorized travel or transport.112 
Another program from the Smart Border initiative was the NEXUS program that 
reflected the priorities of the two governments.113 The goal was to balance economic 
interests with security concerns. The NEXUS allowed business groups to travel across 
the border in dedicated lanes for expedited crossings. As the largest trading partner of 
Canada, the businesses that travel across the U.S.-Canadian border are a vital part of that 
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partnership.114 In addition, the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program focused on 
commercial trucks shipping back and forth across the U.S.-Canadian border.115 
The two states have a shared history and similar cultural traits. The programs that 
have been set up between the two nations have altered in some ways but the general 
understanding that what effects one side of the border will directly impact the other has 
not changed since 1776. The two nations prosper with cooperation and like the 
convention that Europe has set up, more cooperation can create safer and stronger bonds 
for both countries. 
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IV. SCHENGEN CONVENTION 
The U.S.-Canadian border dynamic demonstrates one approach for relations 
between non-combative states. The SC, which has been in place since 1995, provides an 
alternative model for international border cooperation. The ever-expanding outer borders 
of the Schengen area, currently encompassing 26 European nations, stand to prevent 
contraband and individuals from entering the zone without proper authorization. An 
invisible wall protects the participating nations from external threats while removal of 
internal borders allows free movement of vetted people and goods. 
The European continent has a long history of bitter rivalry and warfare between 
the nations, and their interactions created long lasting scars. Despite all the history of 
conflict, the nations were able to overcome these issues and create a completely different 
system of political cooperation. Most of the 28 EU nations have different origins, 
languages and customs, which complicate their ability to understand one another.116 In 
order to fully understand the impact of the Schengen Convention and the role it has taken 
for both border security and enforcement, it is necessary to explore its creation, 
modification and scope.  
The SC, named after the settlement in Luxembourg that hosted the signing, 
creates a common area for countries to enjoy easy access and security under one 
program.117 The map in Figure 3 shows the current countries in the SC. While not all EU 
nations are part of the convention, the Schengen area essentially envelopes all of Europe. 
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Figure 3.  Schengen Area118 
The Schengen convention began when France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg pushed to share borders to facilitate the rapid movement of 
people and products within a common area and a security zone pushed to their external 
borders.119 There were two key parts of the agreement that altered the previously 
accepted view of borders and created the Schengen way of border enforcement. First was 
the renouncement of internal border controls between complying nations. The priority of 
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a nation agreeing to be part of the Schengen contract would be shared sanctuary among 
members of the security zone. Thus, the SC superseded the national identity that was 
determined by the borders and pushed the safety zone to the perimeter of the entire group 
of participating nations. The second part of the new border program was the loss of 
control over the border in common areas except in extreme circumstances with expressed 
consent of fellow Schengen states.120 
Instead of a person entering a state to conduct business in that state alone, the new 
system allowed people to enter one state and have unrestricted movement throughout the 
entire SC zone with limited or no tracking of movement.121 The idea of a nation granting 
such large amounts of authority to other states without significant assurances of 
enforcement but instead on trust was a significant change to the status quo and the nature 
of state relations in modern history. 
A. ISSUES LEADING TO SCHENGEN 
The Schengen convention was created in a fast changing and globalized world 
and many of the influences that led to the changes of the border systems happened in an 
ad hoc manner. Tracing the steps shows how the nations dealt with various factors and 
how these changes helped form the Schengen environment.  
Prior to Schengen, most of the European states utilized a method similar to the 
Westphalia method, established from the peace treaties of 1648 that defined State 
sovereignty as the sole factor deciding on the matters inside the borders of nations and 
further described interactions between other states.122 The enforcement of the border is 
dependent on the nation’s ability to provide the force and manpower needed. This 
requirement was not consistently provided for by European states from the inception of 
Westphalia until large scale forces during WWI challenged the circumstances that had 
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kept states disinterested in the borders and immigration controls.123 The issues that 
brought the borders into the political arena included global level financial crises, massive 
immigration fluctuations, and a greater concern over internal security from the threat of 
outside groups. The financial issues came into the debate over concern of import and 
export concerns.  
A push for open borders in Europe did not originate with the SC. In 1957, the 
Rome Treaty on European Economic Community attempted to remove hindrances to 
trade for all of the nations that participated by “abolishing … obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital.”124 The next step for a common area was the 
creation of the European Customs Union in 1968,125 which founded a system for 
goods.126 However, the borders did not open for another 30 years.127 The next step 
towards open borders came with the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which created the 
European Union.128 The act had the same goal of an area without internal borders and 
had twelve signatory nations.129  
The 1988 report, Europe 1992: The Overall Challenge, overseen by economist 
Paolo Cecchini struck a major chord to the European community by demonstrating that 
the lack of openness throughout Europe may cost more than 200 billion European 
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Currency Units (ECU).130 The report describes the problem with Europe’s system of 
competing markets and unneeded border inspection stations.131  
B. SCHENGEN FEATURES 
The features of the SC ensure a successful open border policy. The integrity of the 
outer borders remains a critical concern for all participating nations to preserve the 
national security of the inner borders. The initial agreement encountered complications 
from French concern in 1993 after the executive committee (Comex) was created.132 The 
French were worried that the outer borders were not fully capable of keeping 
unauthorized individuals out of the encapsulated sector of the Schengen area. With all of 
the concerns addressed; the signatory nations agreed to the full implementation of the SC 
in June 1993. Ultimately, the SC was able to resolve technical issues and implement the 
agreement on March 26, 1995.133  
The major components of the initial SC consisted of Comex, the Schengen 
information system (SIS), and a common visa program.134 Each of the parts will be 
looked at in greater detail to fully understand the difference between the new changes and 
the previous method.  
1. Comex 
Comex was the legislative program that the SC created in order to discuss and 
establish rules for the participants and deal with any complications that arise between the 
states. Comex gained authority over the other groups directly from the legislation of the 
convention. Ultimately, this legislative body was dissolved when the Treaty of 
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Amsterdam, signed in 1999, authorized the SC to be a part of the EU and the European 
Union Council (EUC) became the leading body for the program.135 While the name of 
the body has changed, its purpose remains the same. 
2. Schengen Information System 
The SIS provides the infrastructure and linkage that is critical to keeping all of the 
nations updated and knowledgeable of threats across the various border points. Before the 
implementation of the SIS there was not a system that united all of the nations with the 
same level of information and details. The SC lists the requirements and expectations of 
the SIS and how all participants must comply with the program and contribute to the 
system.136 Some of the specific requests include: alerts on people and property regarding 
border checks, visa issuance, residency permits and other types of similar information.137 
The second generation of SIS, SIS II activated April 9, 2013 and added features of 
biometrics and increased security.138 The system holds information on individuals that 
may have been convicted of violent crimes, missing person reports, and multiple other 
descriptions pertinent to border patrol agencies. All of the data is available throughout the 
EU and Schengen states.139 This database is a significant advantage for the program and 
aids in crime prevention. In the arena of crime prevention, the ability of police forces to 
cross borders in order to capture fleeing suspects has been expanded by the SC to loosen 
some of the red tape that borders have inflicted.140 
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3. Common Entrance Procedures 
The SC ensured that all people and products entering the states complied with the 
same level of inspection and entrance rules.141 Entrance visas are valid by all issuing 
agencies throughout the Schengen area for a predetermined amount of time and not 
required to travel inside the area.142 While the borders inside the zone are relaxed, there 
are still state rules and sovereignty within each state that does not expire. In addition, the 
borders can be reinforced in times of emergency or in preparation for pending hazards.143 
4. External Border Defenses 
The initial border defenses of the SC calls for each nation to ensure external 
borders are secure in accordance with standard rules and procedures.144 In 1999, the 
Tampere Program pushed for a cohesive border patrol that guards all the external 
borders.145 On October 26, 2004 the European Council (EC) created the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member states of the European Union also known as (Frontex).146 Each state retains the 
responsibility for security and inspection at the external borders under this agency; the 
goal is to improve the coordination between the various nations and provide any needed 
support.147 The inauguration of the agency was June 30, 2005, and it was tasked with the 
following tasks:148 
 coordinate operational cooperation between Member States as regards the 
management of external borders; 
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 develop a common integrated risk assessment model and prepare general 
and specific risk assessments; 
 help Member States train their national border guards by developing 
common training standards, providing training at European level for 
instructors of national border guards, holding seminars and offering 
additional training to officials of the competent authorities; 
 monitor research relevant to the control and surveillance of external 
borders; 
 assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and 
operational assistance at external borders; 
 provide Member States with the necessary support in organizing joint 
return operations. The agency may use the Union resources available for 
this purpose and must draw up an inventory of best practice for the 
removal of third-country nationals residing illegally in Member States; 
 deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Member States under urgent 
and exceptional pressure due to, for example, a massive influx of illegal 
immigrants. 
The idea of open borders between the states of Europe was much closer to being a 
reality for the states that signed up for the initial SC. The implementation of the treaty 
was not just a matter of a signature and tearing down the border facilities. The next step 
was to alleviate concerns about security and sovereignty.149  
C. COUNTRIES JOIN SCHENGEN 
France was alarmed with more than security when voicing concerns over the 
program. The question of security and the fear of other nations not securing the border 
continued to rise in the debates while the initial states still tried to implement the SC.150 
These concerns were dealt with and the program went online with the core group of 
nations. Every state that joins after this had to meet the new requirements set forth that 
included the SC rules. In Article 140 of the SC, all the European nations can become part 
of the Schengen area.151  
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Italy was the first nation to pursue membership after the initial five ratified SC in 
November 27, 1990, and it became a full member in July 1997.152 The legacy of the 
Treaty of Rome and the fact that Italy was one of the founding nations to push for a 
European Community pushed the Italians to join the SC. In addition, the rest of the SC 
nations wanted to gain additional legitimacy and gain a significant European ally.153 The 
group was concerned with the stability of the Italy’s external borders its ability to prevent 
illegal immigration from crossing into the Schengen area.154 To alleviate the concerns of 
the other nations in Schengen, inspection teams conducted in-person reviews of the steps 
the Italians had taken to comply with all of the SC requirements and then set a date for 
entrance into the SC.155 
Another country that presented a challenge for the SC countries was the nation of 
Denmark. Denmark was geographically located within the EU but diplomatically 
interwoven with the Scandinavian countries. If Denmark was allowed to become part of 
the SC, the ties to the rest of the Scandinavian nations would not be possible in the same 
fashion.156 The Nordic Passport Union, signed in 1957, allowed the citizens of the 
countries of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland to travel throughout the 
regions involved.157 Initially, there was debate over nations outside of the EU being 
permitted into the SC and the complications over the process of incorporating the SC into 
the rules of the EU.158 The solution was presented in two parts: the first came when 
Sweden and Finland joined the EU, and the second part of the solution came from a 
request to include the two remaining nations in the SC but with no voting rights for 
further changes.159 The nation of Denmark will be looked at in greater detail to better 
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compare to the U.S. and Canada and look at the nation’s view of international 
cooperation and border security prior to the creation of the EU, their acceptance of the 
Schengen convention, and the changes that occurred in the nation after the 9/11 attacks 
and during the 2011 alteration of Denmark’s enforcement of the Schengen agreement. 
D. EU NATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE SCHENGEN CONVENTION 
Not every nation decided to accept the rules of the SC once the EU adopted them 
as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK and Ireland both requested to have access to 
the SIS in order to assist in police and drug matters but not to be part of the open border 
policy for the rest of the Schengen area.160 The Irish decision was based partly on the 
desire to maintain the common travel area with the UK to ensure the populace could 
move between the two nations at the same rate as before.161 Nations that join the EU 
must ensure their border security complies with the requirements set forth by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and decided by the EU.162 
E. WHAT DOES SCHENGEN ACHIEVE 
The motivation for creating the SC was to lower the costs of business and increase 
profits. This motivation has not been the sole purpose of the plan and multiple other 
effects have come from the agreement. As previously discussed, the SIS provides 
significant amounts of information to multiple customers.  
The SC opens the border and helps business travel throughout the region with 
lower wait times across borders. The costs of border agents are transferred across all of 
the Schengen area nations and the threat is spread across the area as well. Despite 
temporary increases to the internal borders, most of the nations are satisfied with the 
Schengen and have elected to remain with even more nations attempting to enter into the 
zone at this time. The SC is not going anywhere in the foreseeable future and lessons 
should be learned from the experience. 
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V. DENMARK, THE EU AND THE SC 
The nation of Denmark did not enter the SC at its beginning, and as previously 
discussed, there were complication for its adoption into the Schengen area. Once the EU 
began to adapt the SC, through the Treaty of Amsterdam, into its foundation, there were 
further issues for Denmark to deal with.163 The issues of the Treaty of Amsterdam deal 
primarily with the alteration of the EU pillars that broke up the responsibilities of running 
the international group. The three pillars; the community pillar, foreign policy and 
security pillar, and the police judicial pillar were removed with the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty.164 The law of Europe was now in concert with the laws of Schengen. The border 
between the SC nations must be open between the other states except in emergency cases 
and with proper permission from the other nations.  
A. DANISH ORIGINS 
Before exploring the situation of 2011, it is necessary to understand the build up 
to the predicament and the foundation of the government. The current nation of Denmark 
can trace some of its current territory and customs to the Viking period of more than 1000 
years previously.165 The territory expanded and contracted throughout this time period 
but the fundamental location of the country in the mouth of the Baltic Sea was a critical 
part of the history of the state.166 The country can trace its cooperative nature to the 
Kalmar union that was a group of kingdoms that included Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
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Finland and Iceland formed in 1397 by Queen Margrethe.167 This legacy lasted for a little 
over a hundred years, but it set a precedence of Nordic state cooperation.168 
From this beginning, the country continued to interact with its neighbors, despite 
war and an ever decreasing territory, but the level of collaboration amongst the Nordic 
states included negotiation with the concerned neighbors in lieu of armed conflict for 
difference.169 During World War I, all of the Scandinavian states cooperated in neutrality 
and agreed to trade amongst them.170 Even after World War II, Denmark emerged as a 
country capable of membership in the larger international community and behaved as 
such.171 
In 1953, a new constitution was approved and the current system of parliament 
was ushered into existence. In 1956, the People’s Pension was created. This pension was 
the primary bargaining chip in the 2011 border crisis and will be further explained in the 
following section.172 
B. BORDERS RETURN TO SCHENGEN 
From May until September 2011, the level of border controls at the land borders 
of Denmark were scheduled to be increased to resemble a traditional border outside of the 
Schengen area.173 The plan included building a customs house and other permanent steps 
at the border with personnel and gates to check people and products as they traveled into 
the country.174 When Finance Minister Claus Hjort Frederisksen announced the change, 
he stated that the increase in border presence between parties of the Schengen agreement 
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and Denmark was to lower crime and illegal immigration inside the country.175 The 
changes in Denmark came only a few months after the French border had been 
temporarily closed due to immigration control between Italy and France.176 
The French crisis arose from an influx of immigrants from Italy. There were 
approximately 25,000 people fleeing North Africa for Italy, and there was a concern they 
would provide a large financial drain on the country. There were 2,800 people detained 
on the French border and almost 2,000 of these detainees were returned to either Italy or 
Tunisia.177  
Denmark passed strict anti-immigration legislation led by the Danish People’s 
Party (DV) and strove to reduce immigration from non-western countries.178 The 
restrictions included working limitations and taxing for marriages and limited benefits. 
Much of these issues have been altered since the Danish election in September 2011, with 
the new group promising to grant citizenship to additional groups, additional welfare 
benefits, and less fees to apply for government services.179 
The push for tighter borders in Denmark is a direct representation of political 
cooperation for two parties to achieve their mutual goals. The 2011 Danish Prime 
Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen was the leader of the conservative-right Liberal party, 
Venstre in Danish.180 Rasmussen was unable to achieve the economic changes he 
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desired.181 The pension reform was not an arbitrary decision to change the budget in 
Denmark. Since 2008, serious financial burdens including the high expense of the 
Efterløn, a Danish pension program, were being targeted to reduce for financial 
savings.182 The Efterløn plan was lauded for allowing the working class to retire after 
years of manual labor, while detractors worried about the possible abuse of early 
retirement.  
The pension’s support among the working class and its large membership in the, 
DV created the bond between those wanting to reduce the cost of the pension and the 
party that wants increased border security.183 The far-right group DV was motivated to 
increase the border control but the leading party was the Left, Liberal Party of Denmark, 
and they did not have the same agenda.184 In order to alter a pension program that the 
Liberal Party did want, they needed the support of the DV to get these changes into law. 
The DV priorities, per its website, show support for strong national integrity and 
domestic security.185 Both sides were motivated to cooperate to achieve their goals. Once 
the terms for mutual agreement were determined, the next step was to implement the 
change to the borders. Thus in May 2011, the border changes were announced. 
The implementation of the agreement would not be as simple as the negotiating 
was. Denmark agreed to the terms of an open international border in accordance with the 
requirements set forth in the Schengen Convention. The EU could not afford to 
jeopardize the integrity of the SC by allowing member nations to increase internal 
borders on a permanent basis. The desire for increasing border security inside the state 
was directly at odds with the obligation of an open Schengen area. At the same time the 
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internal demand on the Danish government in support for the changing the pension plan 
placed the Danish leadership between two opposing obligations.  
According to the author Malthe Munkøe, there were direct inconsistencies 
between the English and Danish versions of the Danish Border plan.186 The Danish 
translation was titled “Permanent border control in Denmark,” while an English press 
release stated “this does not mean that the Danish police will be permanently present at 
the border.”187 The English version of the plan glossed over the specific aspects of the 
increased security and catered to the EU nations and their concerns of a loss of Schengen 
integrity. The Danish version reinforced the priorities of the DV and the internal calls to 
increase the border security. The difference between the two translations does not 
automatically mean deceit was intended, but the subtlety does allow the possibility of an 
intentional duplicitous nature of a government saying one goal for the international 
community and another one for the domestic group. 
The actual changes of the border included 50 additional customs staff agents, new 
buildings, cameras and other support equipment.188 The changes were to take place in 
two phases. The first phase began in July 2011 and included the additional agents being 
placed on the border.189 The EC stated that it was up to the Denmark government to 
prove the changes would comply with all of the EU treaties that had been agreed to by 
the Danes under the SC.190  
Before any of the new changes were even implemented, the EU and the rest of the 
Schengen nations worried about the implications of additional border scrutiny at the 
internal border policies that Denmark was planning. Once phase 1 began, the EU sent 
representatives to assess the changes and determine if Denmark was violating the EU 
rules. The eight delegates failed to fully evaluate the changes since they did not observe 
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any agents active on the border, Danish authorities claimed that the infrequent nature of 
the inspections further validated their plans.191  
The EC did not believe that the increase was needed; however they did not 
prevent the Danish government from continuing the planned rollout of the increased 
border security.192 From the beginning of the announcement of the increased border 
security there were members in the EU that did not believe the changes were legal under 
the SC and stated this to the Danish government on several occasions.193 The next phase 
of the plan was not implemented by the Danish government. The September 15, 2011 
election gave a new group the lead in Denmark’s parliament. One of the first priorities for 
the Social Democrats was to reverse all of the changes that the previous party had started 
in the border.194  
C. ELECTION IN DENMARK 
The election changed the dynamic of the parliament, giving the center-left Social 
Democrats and other similar minded liberal parties 89 seats.195 That left only 86 seats for 
the center right groups, including the Venstre and DV parties.196 This ended a decade of 
control by right-leaning parties. The economy was the fundamental issues raised during 
the election and the right-leaning incumbents were trailing two-three percentage points 
until the election.197 The final results were not as severe as anticipated when the Venstre 
Party was able to slightly close the gap. 
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The changes were not long lasting and many of the planned alterations could not 
be assessed by the rest of the European community. After the Danish border changes 
were announcements in May 2011, there was a significant concern around Europe that 
this increase in border enforcement would change the SC and undo all of the cooperative 
benefits that the Schengen had striven to deliver. Throughout the ordeal, Denmark raised 
the border security higher than other nations but did not close the border as the initial 
announcement promised. The most significant aspect of the experiment in Denmark is the 
amount of sovereignty shown to remain with each of the SC nations. Although the open 
border is the primary function of the agreement, nations can and do increase their internal 
security when needed.198  
D. CONCLUSION 
Denmark’s long history includes many examples of multinational cooperation. 
The latest example was inclusion of the Schengen Convention in 1996. In 2011, Denmark 
exercised its option to include additional border security for its internal borders despite 
having other SC nations surrounding it on all sides. This temporary surge did not receive 
positive support around Europe and was not fully evaluated by the rest of the EU to be in 
compliance or against the SC. The results of the changes were too short to observe any 
change in security or safety levels inside the country or to observe a change to 
surrounding states. The significant take-away from this event is the understanding of 
domestic politics on the international stage and the understanding that local politics may 
not understand the impacts of the changes. 
Denmark has political obligations that must be balanced between both the EU 
community as trading partners and the internal politics that every nation is responsible 
for. The national government may not anticipate the implications of changes at one level 
of government across another. The larger international community must cooperate with 
its allies in order to properly understand and support the needs of its partners and 
commercial interests. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines threats and responses in U.S.-Canadian border security, and 
compares the U.S.-Canada border relationship with that of the European Schengen 
Convention. The U.S. and Canada present an interesting case study of mutual cooperation 
in border security for more than 200 years. The collaboration changed in some ways after 
9/11; however, there remains a strong level of interaction between the two nations. 
Chapter II of the thesis described at the defensive tools at the border between the 
U.S. and Canada. Multiple technological advances including UAVs, sensors, and other 
systems are also in place across the border and focus on prevention of people and 
contraband illegally crossing the border. In addition the U.S. border patrol under the 
authority of the DHS provides personnel to physically guard the border. The threats 
include drugs, various weapons, and terrorists. Each of the weapon systems provides 
different challenges to detect by the groups working to preserve the integrity of the 
border. Canada and the U.S. must continually reevaluate the technology in order to 
counter the ever-evolving threats along the border. The border is an area of commerce as 
well as conflict. The U.S. must continually track the adversarial technologies and adapt in 
order to protect and enforce the border. 
Chapter III examines the history of the U.S. and Canada from 1776 until present 
day to understand the current relationship between the two nations. There are policies in 
place across the U.S.-Canadian border to keep all of the agencies coordinated and ensure 
safe commerce in both directions. The U.S. and Canada continued to bond after Canada 
separated from Great Britain. After WWII, the bond grew even stronger, as the common 
enemy of the USSR allowed the two states to work towards mutual peace on the North 
American continent and a strong level of mutual defense. The USSR did not directly 
threaten Canada, but its commercial interests were tied with the western world so an 
alliance with the U.S. made the most sense. Until 9/11, the U.S.-Canadian border was 
essentially an open border with few requirements for citizens of the two nations to cross 
back and forth. Despite the U.S. inclination to take over the border security unilaterally, 
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the two nations collaborate to share the burden of security to ensure safety for their 
citizens.  
After 9/11 border regulation and defense grew more intensive, however 
commercial relations between the states have remained strong. To further protect the two 
states, each country created a large organization that works to coordinate national defense 
and the multiple agencies that are necessary to protect the nation. In the U.S., DHS works 
with representatives from law enforcement, military and civilian entities. Threats include 
weapons, drug dealing entities and terrorist groups. All of the challenges must be met to 
protect the border. On the Canadian side, Public Safety Canada (PSC) leads homeland 
security.  
The bond between the U.S. and Canada prior to the attack of 9/11 can be 
compared to that of the Schengen Convention (SC), in which the focus is on securing 
external borders, while leaving borders between member countries relatively open. But 
since 9/11 there has been an increased emphasis on stepping up security along the U.S.-
Canada border. Some experts, especially in the U.S., argue that border security needs to 
be tightened further, while others, often in Canada, argue that attempts to increase 
security along the U.S.-Canada border are unnecessary and harmful toward trade and 
commerce.  
Chapter IV traced the steps that Europe took in order to create the current 
Schengen border system. In 1985, five nations set up a large area with all of the internal 
borders removed for goods and people to travel between once they had permission to 
enter the “Schengen area.” This system eventually enlarged to include 26 nations in the 
Europe. Many of the participants are members of the EU as well. Features of the 
Schengen include a border agency that coordinates with member countries called 
FROTNEX and an information system that is shared throughout the region called the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), currently in its second iteration. All of the functions 
of the SC are currently managed by the European Council. The fundamental part of the 
agreement is the open borders and lack of controls for the nations to allow for people to 
travel, live and work anywhere inside the agreed area. In order to create this level of 
cooperation, it is critical for the nations to collaborate on the international issues that 
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compromise the agreements and find solutions that properly balance the needs of each 
nation with the larger needs of the collective. 
Chapter V looked at the situation that took place in 2011 in Denmark. Europe had 
instituted the Schengen Convention to have open borders between participating nations. 
The convention allows for goods and people to travel freely between the participating 
areas, with few, if any, internal border controls. In 2011, however the Danish government 
made the unilateral decision to increase security for its internal borders, rejecting the 
argument that Danish security could be ensured through reliance on external border 
security on the part of Schengen nations. The Danish move represented a kind of “natural 
experiment,” putting into place increased security measures similar to those advocated by 
some for the U.S.-Canadian border.  
Although the Danish decision was soon rescinded, the lessons of this brief 
experiment in increased border security are that homeland security decisions are often 
based more on arguments about sovereignty and politics, rather than on objective 
determinations of threats and security. The decision to increase the border controls came 
from a desire from the leading party in Denmark to change an economic policy that was a 
priority for the group. However, they did have the political strength to alter the policy—
regarding pension without support of a smaller right-wing political party that was 
concerned with security and reducing immigration. To get the support for the pension 
change, the leading party agreed to increased border enforcement. This temporary surge 
did not receive positive support around Europe. The change in border policy was too 
short-lived and not fully implemented to produce any traceable change in security for the 
Danish homeland. However, the Danish did discover that local and international politics 
do not operate in separate realms and the effects of one political sphere can spread across 
many layers of government. This may not be an intended consequence of any changes, 
but must be anticipated and planned for in a growing international arena. An additional 
take-away is the understanding that homeland security decisions are often more political 
than substantial and must be properly balanced between the commercial cost and the 
political one.  
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The Danish government is not the only European nation to test the limits of the 
Schengen Convention. In February 2014, Switzerland voted to increase immigration 
enforcement within its nation. It is too early to discover the level of change this may have 
on the larger European community and the SC, but it is another example of how a 
nation’s domestic homeland security policies have an effect on the international level. 
Denmark did not retain any of the border changes that the administration started in 2011 
after a new leading party reversed the course. Switzerland’s current changes may provide 
additional insight to the stability and future of the Schengen Convention, and show the 
North American nations whether it is possible for states to cooperate and still remain 
members of the cooperative international markets within the EU and the larger economic 
zones as the internal pressures call for greater isolations and immigration controls.  
The lessons of the Danish experiment and the understanding of domestic politics 
impacting the international community pertains to the U.S.-Canadian relationship today. 
The segment of the Danish government that called for increasing the border did not 
concern themselves with impact beyond the edges of Denmark. They wanted a decrease 
in a perceived threat from immigrants and criminals and are not worried about rising 
costs due to border inspections and related fees. The impact of the local changes on 
international politics can be difficult to predict, but these changes must be studied and 
allies should be considered.  
Applying these lessons to the U.S. and Canada can help two nations that have 
prospered under an open border for much of their history. Despite calls for increased 
border security since the 9/11 attacks, the Schengen Convention offers of a model of how 
the US and Canada can benefit from returning to an open internal border and push the 
threat as far from the mainland as possible. As in Europe, an open and cooperative border 
can function and even succeed to keep people and contraband out of the two nations 
while helping commercial interests succeed. Our nation’s goal should be to return the 
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